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The amount of ammunition being consumed in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has surpassed all estimates. This is starting to put pressure on the production and supply chains involved in the manufacture of ammunition for artillery guns among other weapons systems.
This is not an unprecedented problem. In warfare throughout history, armies have often underestimated the level of force and destruction of equipment that will be encountered and the amount of ammunition that will be consumed.
Time and again, this has affected military planning. For example, a lack of shells for British artillery in the first world war resulted in a crisis that led to the downfall of the government of Herbert Asquith.
But the protagonists of the two world wars were typically able to sustain their efforts despite huge levels of destruction comes down to the fact that weapons of that era were relatively simple to produce compared to today’s sophisticated military hardware. And the relative cheapness of the weapons allowed extensive numbers to be produced during the conflict.
Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers understand the big issues. You can also subscribe to our weekly recap of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.
The Russo-Ukrainian war has not involved loss rates of equipment or consumption of material on the scale of the world wars. But, despite this, destruction of major, technologically cutting-edge, equipment can cause a headache for military planners and strategists.
Nato members and other European countries have sent a great deal of equipment, beginning with air defence systems and escalating more recently to main battle tanks such as the Challenger II and Leopard. If the security of individual nations, Europe and Nato is to remain secure, this equipment will have to be replaced.
While losses of equipment in the Russo-Ukrainian are difficult to verify, various bodies including Oryx and Army Technology, an open-source intelligence site, have provided estimates on equipment losses. But when looking at these figures it is important not to look at just the raw numbers. Weapons lost, destroyed or used up need to be compared with the total numbers estimated to have been deployed.
Estimates of the numbers of Russian equipment deployed since February 2022 are 15,857 infantry fighting vehicles and 1,391 aircraft. Their estimated losses, up to the end of December 2022, according to Oryx, are 794 infantry fighting vehicles, 71 aircraft and 91 artillery pieces.
Ukrainian estimated available deployment has been 3,309 infantry fighting vehicles and 128 aircraft. Their estimated losses as of the end of December 2022 are 418 infantry fighting vehicles, 55 aircraft and 92 artillery pieces.
Major modern defence equipment, such as the F-35 Lightning fast-jet aircraft and the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, is becoming ever more sophisticated and expensive. So it’s no longer possible for replacements to be manufactured quickly. And the sheer cost of this hardware means it’s virtually impossible to keep replacements in reserve for when losses occur.
When ordering the F-35 Lighting, with the first deliveries expected in 2012, the UK originally set out to purchase a total of 138 aircraft. But the timeline for reaching this total has been delayed and now that number has been reduced due to affordability problems.
The first batch of 48 aircraft is due to be delivered by 2025, with an additional 27 by 2033. This delivery schedule, which represents less than four aircraft per year between 2025 and 2033, has been agreed with the manufacturer largely on production and cost factors. Such numbers make the creation of a reserve force next to impossible.
Such a delivery schedule, caused partly by having to spread deliveries over a longer time period due to cost implications, but also because of the length of time that such equipment takes to be manufactured, means these assets become of increasing value.
Reports suggest that it takes more than 41,000 hours per worker to manufacture an individual F-35 jet aircraft. Such a lead time in manufacturing limits the total amount that can delivered in any one year. With the current backlog of orders awaiting delivery, the replacement of aircraft lost to enemy action or flying accidents could take many years, and perhaps even decades.
Losing such important and technologically sophisticated military assets, may lead to commanders in the field becoming more risk-averse when it comes to their direct deployment and engagement with an enemy that has an equivalent – or near equivalent – capability.
Without a mass of reserves to replace equipment that has been destroyed in the war, some of this equipment (which – let’s not forget – can cost millions or even billions of pounds) may not be deployed at all. While this is an extreme outcome, the potential for political backlash from the general public is great for politicians and senior military leaders.
This potential for increased risk averseness could mean these cutting-edge assets are not deployed or deployed only in exceptional circumstances.
There’s also an interesting equation involved in modern defence budget calculations. The increasing sophistication and accuracy of today’s weapons means fewer can be deployed to achieve similar damage to the enemy. In other words, more can be achieved with less.
Defence budgets as a proportion of overall government spending have tended to fall since the second world war – and particularly since the end of the cold war. This is what’s known as the “peace dividend”.
But at the same time, individual pieces of equipment are vastly more expensive. Time will tell whether this will mean field commanders are more unwilling to commit to the use of such expensive equipment when it is more difficult to replace. This could change the nature of the conflict and bring another meaning to the phrase the “cost of war”.
Matthew Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The recent bout of shuttle diplomacy around the capitals of Europe by Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, appears to be yielding results.
Zelensky’s appearances in the UK, France and Brussels had two main aims. The first has been constant since the war begin a year ago: to maintain western focus on his message that Ukraine will not accept Russian occupation of his country’s sovereign territory. His second is currently even more important: to continue his pressure on European nations to continue to provide arms.
That his message on Ukrainian sovereignty was getting through was evident. The same day that Zelensky addressed a joint sitting of the UK parliament, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak told the Commons that Britain remained committed to ensuring Russia’s defeat in Ukraine. And days later, Sunak told a Munich Security Conference on February 18: “Now is the moment to double down on our military support.”
One specific issue that emerged from Zelensky’s visit was Ukraine’s need for sophisticated fighter jets. There is understandable reluctance among western governments to provide the latest fighter aircraft, which many leaders see as risking escalation into direct conflict between Nato and Russia. But there is also considerable sympathy for Zelensky’s demands, which could transform the conflict on the ground.
So it’s worth looking in a little detail at how air power has transformed warfare over the past century to get an understanding on how they might affect the conflict in Ukraine.
Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers understand the big issues.
Air power has been used in a variety of ways since the first air raids were carried out by Italian pilots who threw bombs from the cockpits of their biplanes at Ottoman troops during a campaign in Libya in 1911. In more than a century since, air power has redefined how wars are fought, from its reconnaissance capabilities to transporting troops and equipment and mounting aerial attacks on enemy targets at and behind the front lines.
But to gain and maintain aerial power, modern fighter and multi-role aircraft are vital. Apart from anything else, air superiority denies the same capabilities to the enemy.
It was arguably the British, in the development of their thinking surrounding the application of air power prior to 1914, who understood how important it would be to dominate the skies above the battlefield and deny the enemy the ability to use aircraft for observation purposes.
This was put to the test on the western front of the first world war, where all sides used air power in a variety of ways to increase the effectiveness of their ground forces.
Aerial observation proved decisive in the opening phase of the conflict. For example, French air reconnaissance spotted a mistake in the German advance on Paris in September 1914 and allowed the allies to counterattack at the River Marne.
This of course was followed by years of trench warfare, where air reconnaissance allowed both sides to spot any changes in defensive structures or troop buildups. Reconnaissance also enhanced the deadly capabilities of both sides’ artillery.
With guns placed far behind the front lines, it was difficult for the battery commanders to judge the location and range of their targets. Aircraft spotters were able to pass this information back to commanders who could adjust their aim.
In the second world war, aircraft became adept at supporting forces on the ground prior to and during attacks. The British developed a system that allowed close air support to be conducted when required, rather than being planned.
This meant that forces on the ground could request support when required, allowing greater flexibility in planning and conducting operations. Attacks could also be conducted behind enemy lines with the intent of sealing off the battlefield and preventing reserves and supplies from entering the battle.
Aircraft were also used to attack targets of strategic importance in the enemy homeland, as we know from the blitz in London and other major UK cities. Britain and the US also conducted major bombing raids against German factories and oil supplies and on centres of population to target German morale as well as industry.
At present it appears unlikely that any aircraft given to the Ukrainian military by its allies will be used to attack targets in Russia, due to the danger of escalation. But they can be effective in a number of other ways.
Ukraine presently has 175 fighter jets. Boosting that number significantly will make it easier for Ukraine’s air force to conduct more reconnaissance missions. This will be vital ahead of fresh offensives in the spring and summer when better weather brings greater mobility back to the battlefield.
Given the multi-role nature of the aircraft that are being requested, attacks in support of ground offensives through close air support and battlefield air interdiction can also be conducted with greater ease and regularity. This would make Ukrainian ground forces more effective in offensive operations and provide greater resistance in the face of Russian attacks.
It is unlikely that these aircraft will be seen in combat missions over Ukraine in the short term as the training required will take many weeks and potentially months or even years. While they will not guarantee victory, they will provide Ukrainian forces with greater capabilities with which to conduct operations on the ground.
Matthew Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
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