Opinion | The Prigozhin Affair Is Much Less than Meets the Eye

The brief but spectacular rebellion late last month by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the infamous Russian mercenary company Wagner, produced an avalanche of commentary and speculation about the “beginning of the end” of the Putin regime, the capabilities of the Russian military, the stability of the Russian state and what it all means for the war in Ukraine. The conventional wisdom quickly settled on the idea that Russian President Vladimir Putin came out of the episode weakened. Sure, Putin might have survived the march on Moscow, but he will eventually be challenged or replaced. The rebellion, pundits declared, is a sign of deep rot and dissatisfaction within the regime, with Putin unable to explain it to the Russian people while the Russian state is fracturing and regional bosses are prepared to defy Putin. Add it all together, and Russia will struggle to continue waging its war against Ukraine. Really?

There is no doubt that Prigozhin’s rebellion was unpleasant news for Putin. But is the Russian leader weakened? We know very little about what happened between Putin and Prigozhin, a man commonly known as “Putin’s chef.” And what we do know supports very few, if any, of the claims that have dominated the headlines lately.

Is Putin about to be replaced now that members of the elite have discovered that they can challenge the boss? There is no evidence to support any of this. Not a single member of the elite — the security services, the military, the so-called oligarchs — endorsed Prigozhin’s actions, let alone moved to support him in a visible, tangible manner. The one general — Sergey Surovikin — who is rumored to have ties to Prigozhin and possibly somehow involved in the mutiny has not been seen since recording a video pleading with Prigozhin to surrender on June 24. According to some reports, Surovikin has been detained by Russian security services for his alleged role in the mutiny.

In the Byzantine politics of Putin’s court, Prigozhin may have had fans in Russian security services who did not mind seeing uniformed military leaders humiliated. But he crossed the line with his ultimatum that Putin fire Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Russian security chiefs were not prepared to back the brazen outsider, a shadowy businessman from St. Petersburg who has long been a thorn in their side with his rants about the military’s incompetence, criminal record and no ties to the old KGB. He gambled and lost. The regime held steady and remained loyal to Putin. If anything, it is more secure now. With Prigozhin shipped off to Belarus and Wagner disbanded or absorbed into the Ministry of Defense, who is stronger than Putin in the zero-sum game of Russian politics?

Did the rebellion reveal that there is a lot of rot inside the regime? Maybe. But did anyone not know there was at least some level of corrosive corruption inside the Putin regime? Isn’t the whole system built on patronage and kickbacks that in a normal country would be considered “rot” but in Russia are integral to the functioning of the state?

Is Putin going to have a hard time explaining to the Russian people what happened and why he did what he did? That’s highly unlikely. Putin has not even tried to sound the least bit plausible — his address to the nation last week was nothing short of preposterous as he pinned the responsibility for the rebellion on Ukraine. And it appears to be working. A public opinion survey conducted by the only independent Russian pollster, Levada.ru, shortly after the failed rebellion revealed a sharp drop in Russians’ attitudes toward Prigozhin — from 58 percent to 34 percent, numbers that are expected to decline further. Putin’s approval rating remained unchanged at 82 percent. The country is buying Putin’s Ukraine narrative almost a year and a half into a war that was supposed to be over in just a few days. Why change now?

Is the Russian state in danger of fracturing? There’s scant evidence to back up that proposition. Russian provincial governors serve at Putin’s pleasure. He has been hiring, firing and sending them to prison for corruption or other misdeeds, real or otherwise. They are scared of Putin. He has turned them into pawns that he can easily move around the political chessboard depending on his own calculations, ones usually perceptible only to him and a few confidants in his inner circle. The one exception to this rule has been the longtime ruler of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, who is known for two standout qualities: unsurpassed brutality and loyalty to Putin. With his local regime enabled by generous subsidies from the federal budget, Kadyrov is no separatist, and he offered to put his personal militia at Putin’s disposal to crush the rebellion.

Prigozhin’s mutiny triggered speculation about its effect on Putin’s ability to continue waging his war against Ukraine, prompting hopes that the crisis would weaken the Russian army and create an opening for Ukraine to make headway in its counteroffensive. Unfortunately, these hopes appear to have been misplaced. If Wagner is indeed absorbed into the Ministry of Defense, there is likely to be little or no negative effect on the numerical strength of the Russian military. If Putin does fire Shoigu and Gerasimov for incompetence, a more capable leadership may be appointed in their place. Russia’s numerical superiority coupled with skilled generalship would make Ukraine’s counteroffensive even more difficult. That wouldn’t be good.

The Prigozhin rebellion was the biggest stress test for the Putin regime since its inception. The Kremlin passed, not with flying colors, but well enough. Those wishing for the demise of Putin’s regime might think about what could have happened had it not passed the test. Would they rather see the man who takes pride in the brutality of his troops in control of Russia’s nuclear codes? Is that better than Putin?