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UPDATE: As a commenter helpfully pointed out, the person whose tweet I’m responding to was a political science Professor, not a historian. This kind of messes with the framing of this post but rather than stealth re-write it I’ll leave it as is and let you interpret my Freudian slip as you like
When I was in grad school, my Department’s grad student organization made shirts that read, “Political Science: Four sub-fields, no discipline.” Behind this joke is a common observation about political science, that it is defined by its focus rather than a formal set of methods or theories. Not everyone agrees with this characterization, and there have been some efforts to craft political science-specific tools. But generally political science is a field that draws on insights and tools from other areas to study politics. This is most pronounced in international relations. IR looks not just to other fields but also other sub-fields of political science to study the world.
Many present IR’s lack of discipline as a critique. They view IR scholars as a group of raiders, pillaging ideas and methods from other disciplines then returning to our barren homeland. Two recent Twitter kerfuffles, however, demonstrate that this aspect of IR is actually our greatest strength.
I don’t spend much time on Twitter anymore, but I still seem to discover the latest controversy. Two academic ones were related in their attacks on political science.
First, a historian responded angrily to a new article in the American Political Science Review by Anna Grzymala-Busse on European state formation. The historian suggested she used overly-simplistic methods to make a point that “real” experts on early modern Europe already knew (I’ve anonymized the tweet as I don’t like engaging in Twitter attacks).
This is a common complaint I’ve heard from historians studying international issues. IR and CP either take history’s insights and repackage them as our own, or don’t realize historians have already said this. Several academic institutions I’ve been a part of have included fierce and rather petty attacks by historians on political scientists.
As some respondents to this tweet noted, however, this historian isn’t really being fair. The role of religion in state formation is hardly settled ground–I took an entire class on debates over the role of religion in nationalism in grad school. Also, isn’t it a good thing to test and confirm certain arguments using a different set of data and methods? And when pressed, he couldn’t point to what historical works the author overlooked.
Critiques of IR and political science take the place of addressing real issues within other areas of study
In a follow-up tweet, the historian also makes an ironic call for interdisciplinarity. Ironic because this is an interdisciplinary work! Grzymala-Busse combined insights from comparative politics and history to generate new knowledge; this is in line with her other work, which involves careful attention to historical detail. Those calling for interdisciplinary engagement should cheer this, unless “interdisciplinary” just means listening to historians…
The second Twitter incident involved a data scientist. A data science grad student tweeted a broadside against the replication crisis in psychology, followed by attacks on political science and the social sciences in general. Another data scientist responded by pointing out that social scientists don’t conduct our own statistical analysis and instead get “real statisticians” to do it.
Again, people took issue with this. Some noted the data science grad student hadn’t really characterized the replication crisis accurately. Others asked for specific examples (which weren’t forthcoming). I’d also point out that it is true data science does have a real impact on our lives, but it’s hardly a positive one; one data science course I took focused on things like getting around CAPTCHA tests and tricking spam filters. And in practice “interdisciplinary” for data science often means using Python to study political or social issues without engaging actual subject matter experts.
These are very different controversies, and I’m sure these two people wouldn’t agree on much if forced to have a conversation. But both involve the perennial attack on political science (and IR by extension): we don’t come up with our own insights or methods, we just steal the former and implement the latter badly.
I thought of this debate recently while visiting the excellent Jorvik Viking Centre in York, England. The popular view of the Norse raiders known as vikings is of pillaging hordes, and that was certainly the case initially. But as often happens, they settled down. And in the case of Jorvik, they created a thriving cosmopolitan society enabled through their wide-ranging travels.
Maybe I’m pushing this metaphor a bit here, but I think of IR as Jorvik.
Yes, we got our start by combining economic models and humanistic insights. Yes, our research tends to include references from disparate traditions. Yes, our data is messier than other fields or even sub-fields within political science.
These issues all became strengths, however.
Because of IR’s broad roots we have to be conversant in different disciplines. When engaging with people from other disciplines, I often get the sense they’ve never really read anything from my field; their critiques are often caricatures. By contrast, many IR scholars are well-read in other fields.
Additionally, we recognize the difficulty of drawing on and testing different disciplines. That’s why you can find IR and political science discussions about combining methodologies or triangulating among competing schools of historiography.
Finally, the challenge of dealing with incredibly messy data has created problems for IR but also led to fertile debates. For example, the problem of selection effects in conflict onset has led to a useful back-and-forth.
Interdisciplinary means each side listens to and learns from the other, not that one asserts superiority and territoriality
Beyond that, these critiques of political science and IR take the place of addressing real issues within other areas of study. In C.P. Cavafy’s poem, “Waiting for the Barbarians” (which I referenced above) the inhabitants of a classical city sit and wait for the barbarians to arrive instead of dealing with the problems in their civilization. We can sense this in some of the attacks I’m discussing.
Historians are rightly frustrated at the lack of support for and interest in the humanities from universities and the general public. They often, however, see political science as the problem, such as Grzymala-Busse making a splash by engaging in historical debates. I am also reminded of a seminar my grad school put on to help students prepare and turn their dissertations into books; we went around the room discussing our topics and one history student made a crack about how “relevant” mine would be in DC. Rather than finding ways to demonstrate the value of a humanistic and historical approach to contemporary issues, some historians seem to blame political science and IR for sucking up all the attention (and student interest).
Likewise, data scientists are rightly tired of inadequate statistical models and badly interpreted findings. But what many of them seem to miss is that this is not a problem of stupidity: it is over-confidence, something data science tends to exhibit. I also sense a bit of frustration that political scientists are still seen as the expert on…politics despite our lack of cutting edge programming skills. This could be solved by closer collaborations between data scientists and subject matter experts, something that is often lacking.
It’s almost like political science and IR have become the Other to our critics, alleviating the need for any deeper reflection. As Kavafy ended his poem: “those people were a kind of solution.”
So what should be done?
Well, I am just finishing a fellowship at Edinburgh University’s Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities (IASH), which was funded by the Centre for the Study of Islam in the Contemporary World. It includes fellows from across the humanities, as well as the social and natural sciences. Part of the fellowship is a “work in progress” talk, which I gave last week. The empirical subject was my new work using social network analysis to study international religious politics, but the broader theme was my ongoing effort to test concepts from the humanities using quantitative social science methods.
I was unsure about the reaction. I didn’t know if the crowd of humanities scholars would react hostilely to me as an interloper. Instead, it was an incredibly fruitful discussion. There were tough questions and critiques, but they were in the spirit of collaboration and community. They recognized that I valued their disciplines, and they did not see the fact that I drew on theirs and mixed it with others (i.e., my lack of discipline) as a problem.
In this context, interdisciplinary meant each side listened to and learned from the other, rather than one asserting superiority and territoriality. It’d be nice if that attitude spread outside IASH.
The concluding post from the author herself, drawing our symposium on The Ideal River to a close. Dr Joanne Yao is Senior Lecturer in International Relations in the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary, University of London. Previously, Joanne taught at Durham University and the LSE, where she completed her PhD in 2017. Joanne was also one of three editors of Millennium: Journal of International Studies for Volume 43 (2014-2015) and is currently a member of Millennium’s Board of Trustees.Her research centers on environmental history and politics, historical international relations, international hierarchies and orders, and the development of early international organizations. The Ideal River is her first book; Joanne’s next project focuses on the history of Antarctica and early outer space exploration.
One question that repeatedly comes up from readers of this book is about its disciplinary identity. On the one hand, this is one of the book’s strengths – it seems to shapeshift across disciplinary boundaries and some of the central conclusions, particularly on the desire to control nature as a marker of a Western-led (imposed) modernity, might have been arrived at from a variety of different disciplinary starting points. On the other hand, this question puzzles me since the book is self-consciously situated in International Relations which is a clear path-dependent consequence of the intellectual riverbeds my own thinking has flown through. Perhaps what they wish to know is how did someone who started her academic life with the ‘Great Debates’ of IR end up contemplating the physical and metaphysical river (especially since I might have gotten ‘here’ more quickly and eloquently from elsewhere). But like all aspects of social and political life, we don’t get to re-run the experiment, and so this book is here, with its IR-warts and all.
But aside from my own intellectually situatedness, this book is a work of IR because, alongside the three rivers, international institutions are also pivotal characters in my story. Perhaps starting from IR, this point is obvious, and I felt the harder sell was to illuminate my three rivers as worthy protagonists in a story about international order. For this, I might have neglected my other characters.
International institutions have inspired less poetry than rivers, but what I want to show is that their veneer of technocratic dullness does not mean international institutions are devoid of poetry and the imaginaries that animate our dreams and nightmares of the future. The idea that international institutions or organizations can be purely technocratic and therefore apolitical and infinitely generalizable is as lofty an ideal as a river that is perfectly straightened and a frictionless conduit for global commerce. The ideal international institution does political work in that it prevents us from seeing the deeply ideological content of Harrington’s phrase ‘engineers rule the world’. And my hope is that by pinpointing how imaginaries of specific rivers influenced moments of institution-building at three 19th century diplomatic conferences, I can make some effort towards Harrington’s challenge to show when and how geographical imaginaries work (and save them from being relegated to that positivist dustbin of ‘epiphenomena’).
The ideal river and the ideal international institution are siblings conjoined at birth, and in constructing the ideal river, we as an international society are also trying to create the ideal international institution – one model built on all past human knowledge and expertise that can ensure peace and security across the infinite variety of human societies. It is the same grand vision that rests on the same totalizing logic and the same certainty that if we are clever enough and have big enough data, we can find a model that fits. Perhaps because the river is more concrete, it is easier to see the violence the ideal river does to actual rivers (and Danewid expresses this perfectly in comparing the caging of rivers to carceral capitalism), but I think equally, we can consider how the ideal institution does violence to everyday, lived institutions that flower around us. In this way, institutions are also assemblages in the way Phull describes the river, and that we can even think of braided institutions, to borrow from Phull’s (and Wall Kimmer’s) lovely imagery where we can imagine distinctiveness and harmony both at once.
An antidote to the destructive ideal river, Carabelli suggests, is a different way of loving the river. Rather than “projecting, assuming, and directing” the river in an effort to love it through control, Carabelli pushes us to listen, observe, and learn from the actual river to practice a love freed from the need to control. We might also make the same observation about institutions – that we engage in love as control by seeing international politics as solely problems that must be fixed through increased technical expertise. What would happen if we stopped to listen, observe, and learn from the infinite varieties of collective solidarities that have always already populated the international without a desire to fix, control, and master? Perhaps this is a first step towards what the international would look like while immersed in the river.
And, as Birkvad reminds us, in resisting the ideal river and ideal international institution, we must look both ways in time. It is just as easy to idealize an imagined future of straight lines and modern efficiency as a romanticized past where the river and society are frozen in the gauzy prison of nostalgia. Rivers and institutions interact and evolve, and a controlling love over either might seek to return them to an imagined mythical past. In my recent travels, I met a geographer in New Zealand whose research also focused on the ‘ideal river’, but his project looked backwards as different actors steering current river restoration efforts clashed over what they believed to be the ideal river. This romantic yearning for return, Birkvad warns us, can paper over oppression and injustices, and prevent the river and society from flowing and evolving. The question then, is how to look forward downriver without being ensnared by a singular idealized future, and how to recognize the past upriver without being held prisoner by it.
disorderedguests
Day four in the Disorder symposium on Joanne Yao’s The Ideal River, where we are joined by Dr Ida Danewid, who has visited with us before.
Ida is Lecturer in Gender and Global Political Economy at the University of Sussex. Her first monograph, Resisting Racial Capitalism: An Antipolitical Theory of Refusal, is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press. Ida’s research interests are in anticolonial political thought, Marxism, and intellectual history. Her work has previously appeared in Third World Quarterly, Millennium, European Journal of International Relations, International Political Sociology, Security Dialogue and with the Black Mediterranean Collective.
Lake Kariba would soon become a river. The dam would become a waterfall. And miles away, the Lusaka plateau… would become an island.
In The Old Drift, Namwali Serpell writes about the history of colonialism in southern Africa and its global ripples in the present. Told as a story about three families (European, African, and Indian) and spanning three generations, the novel centers around the Zambezi river and the adjacent Kariba dam that transforms the currents of the river (its “drift”) into hydropower. Originally commissioned by the British controlled Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (now Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi) in the 1950s, the dam was built at a place well known to Dr. Livingstone and countless other colonial explorers. (As Serpell notes, “This is the story of a nation—not a kingdom or people—so it begins, of course, with a white man.”) Throughout the novel, Serpell cleverly uses the dam as a symbol of empire, enclosure, and extraction. When the book finally ends, the dam has burst and flooded its surroundings. As the great Zambezi flows freely again, Victoria Falls in more than one way.
I was reminded of Serpell’s novel when I read Joanne Yao’s breathtaking new book The Ideal River: How Control of Nature Shaped International Order. Straddling historical sociology, international theory, and environmental politics, Yao explores the relationship between empire and the control of nature, or what some scholars have recently termed hydrocolonialism. Focusing on the 19th century projects to domesticate three different rivers—the Rhine, Danube, and Congo—Yao examines how the mastery of wilderness was central to the rise and development of the modern/colonial world system. The dream of the ideal river, it here turns out, drifts straight through the heart of empire.
Yao’s immediate focus is on how and why this desire to domesticate the wild became such a central tenet of the imperial standard of civilization. She frames this as a story about the Enlightenment and its commitment to ideas of linear progress, order, rationality, and science. By following the river upstream, she demonstrates how European empires saw the “failure” to conquer, improve, and control nature as a sign of “barbarism” and, thus, as “being too close to nature.” Colonialism, Yao explains, unfolded as a project of eliminating “the barbarity of swampy disuse.” Over time, this mission would come to engulf the globe, ranging from “the floodplains of the Arno River… to the wetlands of the Danube delta and the megadams of the Indian subcontinent and American West.” This desire to master nature has remained a central tenet of coloniality, despite the formal end of empire. In the mid mid-20th century, many newly independent states in the global South chose to showcase their rising power and status precisely through the control of rivers and construction of megadams. Today, the quest for green and renewable energy forms part of yet another attempt to plunder and domesticate the wild.
While The Ideal River is not a book about capitalism—the word is only mentioned a handful of times in the text—it can nonetheless be productively read alongside the growing black radical and anti-colonial Marxist literature on property and racial capitalism. Thinkers such as Brenna Bhandar, Rob Nichols, and Aileen Moreton-Robinson have shown how the rise and development of the capitalist world-system was premised on the racialized transformation of nature into inert objects that can be possessed, extracted, used, exploited, and sold for profit. The destruction of indigenous cosmologies and the violent imposition of private property relations were both central to this reorganization of land into extractable and tradeable objects. At the heart of this project was (and remains) a mode of possessive ownership—what Moreton-Robinson calls the “white possessive”—that renders both land and its inhabitants as disposable, extractable, and in need of improvement. Read alongside this body of scholarship, The Ideal River is perhaps first and foremost a story about how rivers were governed, enclosed, and turned into economic highways as part of the global extension of this “racial regime of ownership.” In the same way that “useless” deserts, savannahs, and forests were to be transformed into productive lands, so rivers were converted into frictionless highways that were to carry commerce, civilization, and Christianity to the world’s unpropertied peripheries.
The most compelling aspect of Yao’s book is perhaps that, through its emphasis on the river as a lifeform (tellingly, the book is dedicated to the Rhine, Danube, and Congo), it offers an instructive framework for thinking beyond such modes of possessive ownership. As Yao and Serpell both remind us, enclosure (be it by prisons, borders, dams, pipelines, or other types of violent infrastructure) produces slow death. Like humans, the river cannot breathe when it is confined. By drifting with the river, in and out of capital’s desire to master and subjugate, Yao thus pushes us to imagine alternative ways of relating to the world around us, beyond enclosures, extraction, and bourgeois property relations: what some scholars and organisers increasingly refer to as abolition ecology. Mujeres Creando, a mestiza and Aymara anarcho-feminist group based in Bolivia, give voice to this worldmaking project on one of the many graffiti walls with which they’ve covered the urban landscape of La Paz:
the land is not the property of masters
the land is not individual property;
nor collective property;
the land is mother to all living creatures
Elsewhere, Glen Coulthard invites us to think about these antipropertarian dreams as a struggle that is “oriented around the question of land… not only for land, but also deeply informed by what the land as a mode of relationships… ought to teach us about living our lives in relation to one another and our surroundings in a respectful, nondominating and nonexploitative way.” Another way to put this is to ask: What might it mean to become unpropertied and unownable? Perhaps the river can guide us here, because as Yao reminds us by reference to the water protectors at Standing Rock, water is kin: “She is alive. Nothing owns her.”
In her essay “Amniotechnics”, feminist Marxist Sophie Lewis makes a similar observation: all humans in history have been manufactured under water, in amniotic fluid. Pregnancy typically ends with the draining of water; and yet, even as we enter the unwet world where drowning remains an ever-present danger, humans remain overwhelmingly water. Lewis writes: water “is by far the greater part of us, yet with just the slightest change of proportion it will drown us; it is entirely dead, yet teeming with the life that can’t exist without it; it is far bigger than us and it is utterly inhuman.” In the messiness of life, where water is bound to flood, spill, and drift, amniotechnics emerges as a vision of radical kinship and communized care, for human and non-human life alike. “It is”, Lewis writes, “protecting water and protecting people from water”: a practice of immersion rather than mastery, and what we may usefully think of as abolition ecology. Water—or should we say the river—is life. Let the dam burst.
disorderedguests
The Disorder of Things is back, and with a symposium too. Over the next week we’ll feature a succession of posts on Joanne Yao’s The Ideal River: How Control of Nature Shaped the International Order, followed by a rejoinder from Joanne herself (the full set of posts will be available in one easy spot here). The first post is an introduction to the book and commentaries from George Lawson. George is Professor of International Relations at the Australian National University. He is a global historical sociologist who works primarily on revolutions. His most recent books are: On Revolutions: Unruly Politics in the Contemporary World (with Colin Beck, Mlada Bukovansky, Erica Chenoweth, Sharon Nepstad and Daniel Ritter) (Oxford, 2022), and Anatomies of Revolution (Cambridge, 2019).
Writing from the frontline of anthropogenic climate change, in Australia, I don’t need any convincing about the co-implication of nature and politics. I live in Canberra – Australia’s ‘Bush Capital’ – a planned city in the Scottian mould, nestled amidst nature reserves, organised around an artificial lake supported by a major dam project, and home to a large number of predators, both human and otherwise. When I moved to Canberra nearly three years ago, the major (non-artificial) lake that welcomes visitors to and from Sydney, Lake George, was empty – the result of decades of low rainfall generated by human-induced climate change. Following three years of La Nina weather patterns, which has brought persistent rain that locals never tire of telling our family we brought with us from Britain, Lake George looks more like an inland sea. But not for long, it seems. Models suggest that this year will see a return to dry conditions, perhaps even a drought. So: no more Lake George.
Outside Canberra’s old Parliament House, which was replaced by a snazzy, environmentally friendly upgrade in 1988, can be found the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, the oldest continuous protest site in the world. Some of the demands made by aboriginal Australian groups, including those who people the Embassy, as well as those involved in discussions around the Uluru Statement from the Heart and current debates about a First Nations Voice to Parliament, begin by acknowledging the co-implication of land, custodianship and sovereignty. Understandings of citizenship in Australia are intimately tied up with claims about the relationship between nature and political authority.
These entanglements between nature and politics are found not only in Australia, of course. As Giulia Carabelli points out in her essay in this symposium, they animate protests in North Dakota and India, have been part of legal debates in Ecuador and Bolivia, and can be found in disputes over the rights of natural objects, including rivers.
Rivers are the subject of Joanne Yao’s wonderful The Ideal River, a book that is – as each of the contributors to this symposium acknowledge – expansive in scope, richly researched and judiciously curated. But Yao’s book is not just about rivers, it is also about the wider relationship between nature and politics and, in particular, the ways in which Enlightenment understandings of science and rationality underpinned international ordering projects over the past two centuries. These projects to ‘tame nature’, Yao argues, were foundational to the construction of a standard of civilisation through which Western polities ordered relations between each other and the peoples they subjugated through imperialism and colonialism: The Rhine was the ‘internal European highway’, the Danube the ‘connecting river from Europe to the near periphery’, and the Congo ‘the imperial river of commerce’. Enlightenment principles of mastery over nature were tied to scientific techniques and ideas of progress in projects that stratified peoples and places around the world. In this way, rivers serve as the elemental source of global governance. For Yao, the taming of nature is a distinctly modern project, one bound up with ideas of mastery and ordering, power and civilisation, rationality and progress.
If rivers and forums of global governance are conjoined twins of the Enlightenment, one modern family member that receives less attention in The Ideal River is capitalism. As Ida Danewid points out in her essay, and as Yao recognises in her response, rivers were imagined as ‘frictionless highways that were to carry commerce, civilization, and Christianity to the world’s unpropertied peripheries’. Despite noting the commercial features of hydro-ordering, and their necessarily extractive, dispossessive properties, capitalism plays a muted role in Yao’s narrative. Sorting peoples into civilized and uncivilized quotients had many dimensions: racial, religious, and more. But a crucial element concerned levels of ‘development’. In Australia, for example, claims of aboriginal sovereignty were often denied on the basis that aboriginal nations were insufficiently ‘developed’ – in other words, they did not support individual property rights or sufficiently ‘advanced’ commercial practices. Here, as in other parts of the world, the standard of civilisation was organised, in significant measure, through capitalist logics – and egregiously misapplied to experiences on the ground in order to dispossess and subjugate First Nations peoples.
A further issue raised by Yao’s interlocutors arises from her interest in the distinctly modern co-location of science, nature and political authority. To contemporary eyes, Wittfogel’s notion of ‘hydraulic empires’ contains deeply problematic Eurocentric associations with ‘oriental despotism’. And rightly so. Nevertheless, it is worth reflecting on the age-old harnessing of water for political claims-making, and the development of scientific advances to do so. No doubt these dynamics have taken novel forms in modernity. But the binding together of science, nature, polity formation and extraction is a long-running entanglement. This raises a linked question about whether the modern standard of civilisation itself changed over time. I wonder whether the ordering of the Rhine in the early part of the 19th century was as severe as the ordering of the Danube in mid-century and, even more so, the Congo in the 1880s? During the course of the century, as modern capitalism became more extensive and ideas of ‘scientific’ racism hardened, so global hierarchies themselves shifted. Not all ordering projects sorted peoples with the same intensity or through the same logics. And not all wildernesses were considered to be equally wild.
The relationship between imaginaries and political projects forms the basis for Cameron Harrington’s contribution to the symposium. Harrington raises the question of why the ‘endless creative potential of the imagination’ became ‘narrowly expressed’ in particular political projects. After all, there was not one ‘modern imaginary’. As Ida Birkvad persuasively argues in her essay, not only was the Enlightenment not a single thing, but modernity also reconfigured a brand of romanticism that venerated nature. In this sense, ‘the time of the first river commissions described in The Ideal River was as much the era of Romanticism, as it was that of Enlightenment rationality’. Today, the sanctification of nature is often associated with protest movements, particularly those by indigenous peoples. Yet, as Birkvad notes, the romanticisation of the past can itself be a political project that maintains and reinforces existing hierarchies and exclusions. Here anti-developmentalism stands as a form of, rather than in opposition to, ordering projects that meld science, nature and political authority.
This speaks to a more complex association between nature and politics than is sometimes apparent. In her essay, Kiran Phull captures this complexity through the notion of the ‘braided river’ – an assemblage of interweaving waterways that ‘split, stray, and merge in ever-shifting ways’ and, in the process, generate a ‘plaited pattern’. This unruly, yet patterned, formation is one that resonates with contemporary concerns over the entanglement of nature and politics, constituted as it is through a complex, multi-scalar tapestry of the global, the transnational, the regional, the national, and the local. Contemporary global governance too is a dense web of overlapping administrative forums. One of the achievements of Yao’s book is to see this dense web as bound up with hydraulic infrastructures. This leaves open the question of what political projects will emerge from the various, often contradictory, imaginaries that bind together science, nature and international politics. Far from occupying spaces of ‘technocratic dullness’, Yao points – quite rightly – to their ‘poetry and imaginaries that animate our dreams and nightmares of the future’. What would happen, she asks, if we stop to ‘listen, observe, and learn from the infinite varieties of collective solidarities that have always already populated the international without a desire to fix, control, and master’? What indeed …
disorderedguests
After months, and perhaps years, of cajoling and haranguing the Hayseed Scholar, friend of the pod (episode14) Matt McDonald finally convinced Brent to turn the tables and become a guest on the podcast.
Matt interviewed Brent at the end of the International Studies Association conference in Montreal, in Matt’s hotel room.
Over a few beers and with much good cheer, they chat about Brent’s growing up in Iowa, attending Chicago Bears games as a kid, having two teachers as parents, and how golf shaped his college decision-making. They discuss Brent’s journey through graduate school, the PhD, and his positions at the University of Kansas and now the University of Utah.
Often pounding the table like some 1930s-era dictator, Brent talks about what the tenure process was like for him at KU, the difficult (but also life-changing) move to Utah, walking with Chase pups for all kinds of reasons, how he approaches writing, and how he unwinds and recharges by going back to Iowa and seeing his family.
Matt and Brent first connected in 2010 when Brent reached out to Matt about his IPS article. That leads to a discussion about how and why Brent sent those complimentary emails to scholars.
A number of F-bombs were dropped. Razzing of Jelena Subotic, Tony Lang, and Chris Agius ensued. Friend of the pod and special guest Cian O’Driscoll made an appearance towards the end of the conversation. It’s a whirlwind discussion, and one Brent remains self-conscious about. But it was also a rewarding experience.
Ansley Franco, a senior at Auburn, said TikTok was a key way for Greek organizations on college campuses to promote themselves.
FreshRSS 
